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Vizag Gas Tragedy: National Green Tribunal Committee Recommends Criminal Prosecution Of LG Polymers

Twelve people were killed and 3,000 people were exposed to toxic Styrene gas in the Vizag tragedy that took place on May 7.

In an inquiry committee set up by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to identify the causes behind the gas leak from the LG Polymers on May 7, the committee concluded that clear cut negligence of the chemical company and lack of training led to the tragedy that killed almost 12 people, 22 animals and exposed more than 3,000 people to the toxic Styrene gas.

India Today listed technical and safety lapses identified by the committee that resulted in the Styrene vapour leak:

  • The M6 tank was of an outdated design.

Tertiary Butyl Catechol (TBC) used as an inhibitor chemical in the Styrene tank to control its temperature, was insufficient and had not been topped up since April 1. Inadequate TBC in the tank led to the rise in temperature and the Styrene started polymerising.

  • The committee reported that the chemical odour of Styrene can be detected at 0.32 PPM in the ambient air. The concentration of the chemical in the air on May 7 at the Venkatapuram village was at hazardous levels of 461 ppm.

Over 24-hours of the leak, the concentration level of the chemical was 374 ppm, and remained at 1.5 ppm on May 10, three days after the disaster.

The only temperature monitoring gauge at the bottom of the tank was of an outdated design.

  • Lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) clearly staked safety preparedness of the chemical factory, the report read.

  • No external water spraying arrangement was available over the storage tank to control any vapour leak, and the chiller system was switched off at 6pm as per the daily routine. There was no automatic sprinkler system.

  • Failure of factory inspectors to confirm safety protocols, and lack of communication between officers and workers.

  • The news organisation reported that a gas detector alarm was noted by the control room at 2:54 am, but the duty officer reached at 3:03 am to the fire hydrant sprinkler valves.

The sprinklers could not be activated as they were within the hazardous vapour zone.

After 1.5 hours, the gas leak was detected, and personnel wearing safety SCABA equipment were able to start the sprinkler system.

  • The public siren was not sounded because it was a manual system. Auto sensors of Styrene failed to detect the leak after vapour started to leak.

  • The statement of the committee read that the factory failed to handle the situation due to lack of training and experience of both the factory inspector and the fire officials.

  • No coordination was done with the district administration of Visakhapatnam and Vizianagaram for rescue and relief efforts. People were stopped from fleeing and kept at a nearby school.

"The root cause appears to be the lack of experience of LG Polymers India and their Korean principal, LG Chem, in monitoring and maintaining full tanks of Styrene that were idled for a long period of several weeks without operation. M6 is an old tank in design terms, this possibly contributed to the problem" the committee was quoted by the media organisation.

The report submitted by NGT on May 28 identified the fault with the Department of Industries, Factories and Boilers for safety lapses, along with the plant's managing director, safety officer, safety department, production department.

The committee also recognized the fault with Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority (VUDA) for approving residential layouts around the factory.

They have now recommended criminal prosecution of LG Polymers and its management.

Also Read: 18 Test Positive After Attending COVID-19 Patient's Funeral In Maharashtra

Contributors Suggest Correction
Writer : Devyani Madaik
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Editor : Prateek Gautam
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Creatives : Abhishek M

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